"Another cause of revolution is difference of races which do not at once acquire a common spirit: for a state is not the growth of a day, neither is it a multitude brought together by accident."--ARm?o?LE, Politics, v. 3.
of science. It seeks quick returns and looks at science as a kind of "universal provider". As a consequence, it turns in politics to quacks, who provide it with such modern cures as: "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people"; "Make the world safe for democracy"; "The right to vote"; "Nationality"; "Self-determination." There is now an excuse ready for everything. "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people" may be the defence of class •government. "Making the world safe for democracy" may sanction the modern "' red fool-fury of the Seine." "The right to vote" may numb voting as a function of living citizenship. "Nationality" may become the pharisaical "I thank thee, God, I am not as other men," and may block the path to any higher human synthesis, any nobler social solidarity. "Self-determination" may cover everything, from the factious and recalcitrant child sulking in its nursery kingdom, to the elemental chaos of a kroup pouting in the twilight of the past, or calling into being the hell of civil war. There is need to-day of some clearing of the ground. We cannot make phrases take the place of hard thinking nor make confusion do duty for clearness. Some attempt at definition is necessary, if we are to be saved from going back in politics. For it must be remembered that in politics, as in moral character, there is no static condition; and there is just the danger that we may mistake movements for progress, and confuse activity with advance.
II
•' Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise truth had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles the more belimed." --HoBBES, Leviathan, I, 4.
In turning then to consider nationalism and self-determination, an effort must be made at definition. We shall see how difficult is the definition of either--" inclusive and exclusive", as the Schoolmen would have said. At the same time some attempt is necessary if we are not to add to the already large confusion of political thought. Indeed this confusion is largely due to the inconstant and fluctuating use of terms. For example, nationalism is used at one time for patriotism, at another for racialism--two social facts which are sometimes incompatible or antagonistic. Nationalism is also sometimes regarded as synonymous with nationality, though it is clear that nationality is frequently used in a semi-legal sense which could not be included under the term nationalism--for example, in a passport or in the returns of the census. It is evident then that if we are to make any progress at all we must try to use clear terms in writing of nationalism and of self-determination.
It is true, of course, that many writers seek to avoid an effort after clearness of meaning--thus adding to the confusion. Lord Cromer avoids the problem of definition in his preface to Mr. Arnold Toynbee's The New Europe, taking refuge in the formula, Definitio est negatio. Professor Ramsay Muir, in his Nationalism and Internationalism, has pronounced nationalism to be an elusive idea of difficult definition: "It cannot be tested or •analysed by formulae such as German professors love." It is undoubtedly true that the term is difficult, but we shall do well to make some attempt at a definition, especially as the very confusion which has already arisen is largely responsible for the growing ambiguities of meaning. At any rate such an attempt will eliminate the use of the word in some sense not present in some individual reader's mind.
What then is nationalism? It is obviously a kind of "common spirit"--that to which Aristotle refers in his Politics. A further distinction however is necessary, as there are varieties of common spirit :--that of a regiment or university; the community of feeling which belongs to a fraternal society; the brotherhood of labour manifested in guild or trade union, or the cementing ethos of a church or religious foundation. The common spirit which animates such organizations has clearly nothing to do with nationalism. We are compelled to seek in the common spirit of nationalism some distinctive and distinguishing feature. We may seek that feature in history. An examination of the historical phenomena of nationalism will disclose many factors which have con-.tributed to it in different generations and in different continents. We can trace in the development of Aristotle's "common spirit" many varied forces at work--racial or supposed racial solidarity; a common language; a common religion; common economic backgrounds; a common history or tradition; common political ideals; common political institutions; a common home. often possessing a certain geographical unity. But are any of these factors common factors?
Racial solidarity is not everywhere a feature of nationalism. In Europe it is largely a myth. It is possible to describe feeling between white man and black man or yellow man as racial antagonism; but from the ethnological point of view, there is to-day among the European peoples hardly one which is not of mixed racial origin. Italy, where one of the strongest national movements of modern times arose, is the home of most composite races. Germany is a blend of Teuton and Slav and Celt. Greece represents almost every race in Europe. The greatest modern nation--the United States--is merely re-enacting in race assimilation what has been going on in European states for centuries.
Identity of language--which is popularly confused with identity of race--has undoubtedly contributed to nation-building, but he would be a fool-hardy historian who would call it an essential element. The Scottish people are a nation, though they speak both English and Gaelic. The Belgians are a nation though they speak both French and Flemish. The Swiss are a nation, though actually tri-lingual.
The diversity of tongues does not discount the reality of American nationalism. We can dismiss identity of language along with a common religion. The latter has brought its gifts to the building of nations; but religious varieties have often been most prominent where nationalism has been strongest and most vigorous.
'Nor can we explain nationalism by common economic interests. These lie behind much in human history, and examples are not wanting of their influences in nationalist movements. Their influences can be seen indirectly at work in the American Civil War, and more directly we can find them at work in the Zollverein, with Prussia at its head, which laid the foundations of the modem German Empire. On the other hand, it wo,uld be hard to find common economic interests at work in the fusion of the Thirteen Colonies out of which the American nation was born. Indeed the nation, as an economic unit, largely exists artificially through the influence of protective tariffs.
It would be possible to examine common history and common traditions and to find that they are not the common factors which we have been seeking. The nationalism of the North American continent, for example, owes little to the past. Nor will common political ideals satisfy our inquiry--they have not been essential. It is when we come to think of a common territorial home that 10 TI-IE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW we seem to' be reaching securer ground. This is a factor common to all varieties of nationalism--if we except the Jews. And even here it is significant that where Jewish nationalism is most real is among the Zionists, who look to Palestine as the home of their national aspirations. Everywhere else nationalism links itself up with a fatherland, a country, which need not necessarily be a "gecgraphical unity". Neither the Polish nation nor the Roumanian has natural boundaries. All that the nationalist spirit demands in the ultimate analysis is that it should have a territorial home round which its aspirations may gather, a common hearth on which the sacred fire may be kept aglow and burning. Other factors, as we have seen, may contribute; but as often as not they rob nationalism of its fairest blooms.
Nationalism in its simplest terms seems to demand nothing more than a common spirit, whatever factors may combine to form it, and a common patria. This common spirit, too, is not merely on fire--it is glowing with a flame that burns but does not consume the hearts in which it rules. For no embers, however bright, will start a national conflagration. No common-day community spirit has national creative force. The Yorkshireman, the Devon man, the Nova Scotfan have common spirits and common homes; but no one would confuse Yorkeshiremen, Devonians, Nova Scotians with nations. There are then diversities of common spirits. There is that which can, without offence, be called localism or provincialism, which expresses itself in the everyday activities of a narrow social group in a narrow geographical area; and there is that higher type which we call nationalism, to which Mr. Zimmern applies the test, Will men die for it?
Yorkshire and Devon and Nova Scotia are fair to see, and to their citizens they bring hallowed ties, precious associations, sacred memories; but before the wider challenge of England and of Canada they are little. The common spirit which we know as nationalism is of such intensity that it consumes the lesser loves as it takes up the gauntlet of defying death. Nationalism then is a common spirit, almost uniformly related to a fatherland; and it is of such consuming force that men will gladly die to preserve it and the patria, which is its outward and visible expression. The diversity of opinions with regard to nationalism is exceller/tly illustrated by the words of Mr. Wilson and of Lord Acton at the head of this section. The former has proved himself not only in his state-papers and public utterances, but also by his actions at the Peace Conference, to be a strong and convinced believer in nationalism. Indeed he appears not only to be its high-priest but also its preaching •friar. If the aspirations of nationalism are recognized, if the map of the world is rearranged along nationalistic lines, the result will be the reduction to a minimum of the possibilities of war, and the coming of a genuine era of peace and good-will. On the other hand and at the other extreme is Lord Acton, a judge of no less weight, who believed that the fruits of nationalism were evil. By "the theory of nationality" he meant the doctrine that national feelings should be the basis of statehood; and this doctrine he had no hesitation in pronouncing "criminal" and "absurd" Superficial thinkers might be inclined to put down the extreme difference of opinion between these two thinkers to a conflict between the ideas of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; between mid-Victorian obscurantism and this age of Reason and Light. It is true that the statesmen of the nineteenth century, both at and after the Congress of Vienna, frequently ignored national aspirations, whereas the statesmen of the Peace Conference seem deliberately to have made an attempt at satisfying them, until the impossibility of their task either wearied them, or a waiting world awoke them to 'realities, and they did not finish the work. But, in reality, the conflict lies deeper and is more fundamental than the difference between two generations. It is a profound difference between vital schools of thought which we have with us to-day, and it runs through most of the recent political literature. On the one side, for example, is Professor Ramsay Muir who has expressed, in his Nationalism and Internationalism, views similar to President Wilson's: "If the whole map of Europe could once be completely and satisfactorily divided on national lines, there might be good hope for a cessation of strife." On the other side, Mr. Zimmern, in his essays on Ara•ionality and Government, has contended with no less emphasis than Lord Acton that "political nationalism does not make for tranquility. It is too self-centred. It has too little sense of the community of nations" Nor is the conflict merely one between political theorists. Gabriele d'Annunzio, Jan Paderewski, Eamonn de Valera, and Henri Bourassa. all men, by the way, of literary and artistic temperament--are attempting to put into practice a belief that nationalism is a force making for good. While at the other extreme of action are Nicolas Lenin and his confreres whose movements are governed by the belief that nationalism is the veritable sin against the Holy Ghost.
If a poll were taken of the public opinion of the world, the overwhelming majority would doubtless be on the side Whatever answer history will give to these questions when the winnowing of the years is over, there are at least certain rather obvious objections to the nation-state, to "self-determination". First, to apply the idea to the map of Europe to-day would be a task of grave difficulties. Professor Masaryk, the distinguished Czech nationalist, estimates that there are in Europe at this moment sixty-eight distinct nationalities. Yet even now, after all the efforts of the Peace Conference, there are still less than thirty "sovereign" states in Europe, and of these hardly half are nationally homogeneous--that is, contain no considerable admixture of other national elements.
If the natibnalist ideals are to be carried out, there remains in Europe a Herculean political labour. To rearrange the map of Europe in nation-states would bankrupt the intellect of the world; at any rate the very conception staggers the imagination. But let us suppose a general attempt being made along honest lines to transform national units into separate states. How are the boundaries of these nationalities to be determined? There are many districts in Europe where two or three national elements exist side by side--how is the boundary line in such cases to be drawn ? As the result, say the exponents of nationalist theory, of a plebiscite, in which the opinions of the majority shall obtain. Thus then "the right of self-determination" seems to disappear as a right, and takes its place in a mechanical theory of head-counting. Let us suppose, however, that such a plebiscite is taken. It is evident that great care will be needed in selecting the precise area of the plebiscite; for the inclusion of a little territory on the one side or the other will often be sufficient to turn the scale. There will be grave dangers of gerrymandering. But granted that the vote is fairly and honestly taken, what will be the result? A small, a hopelessly small, minority of one nationality will be included in a state entirely dominated by another nationality. A fringe of Germans, for example, will be included, willy-nilly, in a Czecho-Slovak nation-state; a remnant of Slavs will be herded into an Italian nation-state. What will be the position of this minority? They will be a negligible quantity; they will have no influence in the policy of the state, or, at any rate, much less influence than if they were a minority of a respectable size; being out of harmony with the dominant nationalist ideals of the state, they will be an alien, a subordinate, and possibly a persecuted people. This brings us to the second apparent objection to the idea of the nation-state. Even if it were possible to make nationality everywhere coincident with statehood the idea would be fundamentally and essentially unsound. To identify the nation and the state is to make nationalism the basis of the state; and, where this is done, nationalism takes the place of those universal principles of justice and humanity on which the ideal state should be founded. It is not denied that nationalism may be both just and humane, but many nationalisms in the past have been unjust and inhumane--the Turks in Armenia, the Germans in Poland and Alsace-Lorraine, the English in Ireland. Indeed, Lord Acton declared that the theory of the nation-state is "a confutation of democracy", since it substitutes for democracy another principle--a principle, too, which is neither universal nor essentially moral, but is accidental and arbitrary. A state must be deeper based, under peril of disaster. Unless the map of the world is to be deliberately tinkered with, as nationalism changes spiritually and physically; unless we are to revise boundaries for each nation-state on some regular basis, such as the decennial census, we must find some more stable basis for the state than the fluid and changing lines of nationalism.
Nor can national feeling Joe given the chief consideration in the making of frontiers. There are military and economic considerations, which are at least practical issues, whatever we may hope for in the future. A state has a legitimate grievance, if its boundaries, by arbitrary arrangement, place it in a position of weakness. When ,France lost her strategic.frontier in 1871, la revanche became a national passion. ]Not a little of the anger in Canada over the Alaskan Bouwdary Award was due to the fact that it gave to the United States two small islands which commanded the entrance to a future-Canadian port and railway terminus. In any case, it must be admitted that natural boundaries are more 'permanent than national lines. Similarly a state has a grievance with regard to trade if it be placed in an inferior ß position to its neighbours. The most striking illustration is the decision of the Peace Ccnference with regard to the Poles and to the Jugo-Slavs, who must have access to the sea as the international highway.
It is sufficiently clear that the idea of the nation-state--the i•iea that national and political lines must coincide--is not only impracticable, but fundamentally unsound. In the initial stages of its application it is charged with friction, and in its logical conclusions it is more likely to turn the world into a slaughter-house than into a paradise. We must admit with regret--for the sincerity of President Wilson and his group need not be doubted--that political nationalism will not work all the wonders which have been claimed for it. On the other hand, we must not rush into extremes and, with the international group, pronounce it as a crime against civilization. Here is something which has blossomed into love for country; which has gilded history with countless deeds of valour, endurance, self-sacrifice, and immortal heroism; which has inspired the noblest poetry, the most pregnant prose, the most enchanting music. We cannot dismiss such a force with a flourish of the hand, or bow it out with punctilious and conventional ceremony. Nationalism is here--a present fact to be reckoned with. It cannot be abolished by order any more than religion. The subjective is outside prohibition. If then it betrays dangerous or anti-social tendencies, the best that we can hope for is to check them not so much by correctness of principle or goodness 'of intention, but by the development of human character and the widening of human wisdom, which seems to point to the diverting of national feeling from the foam and fury of political channels to those in which nationalism has best served humanity. For it is obvious that the trouble with nationalism lies in its political aspect - We must get rid of the delusion that there is not room in the state for more than one variety of national feeling. It would be well indeed if we could grasp the idea that a state which is nationally homogeneous is perhaps in a less fortunate position than a state which contains two or more heterogeneous national elements.
The nation which coincides with the state is too liable to become intolerant, to make nationalism the basis of the state; but the state in which there is a variety of national feeling is forced to learn in the school of experience lessons which will prove useful in world issues. A state, too, which contains varied national elements will have the advantage of healthy rivalries among its component national types, and may be the means of creating a higher national feeling--a supernationalism, such as has been referred to, in which toleration will be the essential feature--that higher type of nationalism which is found in the "common spirit" of the British Empire, with its amazing varieties of national life.
This idea of a supernationalism opens up a vista 'of dazzling
